Cybersecurity in the defence domain

The war in Ukraine, rising tensions in the Baltic region and instability along NATO and EU eastern borders mark a period of structural unrest. Where attention once focused on physical threats, the digital battlefield is now a full operational domain within defence. Cyber warfare is no longer an addition to traditional warfare but an integral part of it. Digital events therefore have direct consequences for physical security and national operational capability.

Explanation

Cybersecurity in the defence domain is directly connected to mission assurance, availability and controlled information exchange. The environment commonly combines enterprise IT, operational technology, specialist platforms, mobile components and supplier connections. These components have different lifecycles, classifications and continuity requirements. A control that is straightforward in office IT may affect safety, interoperability or deployability in an operational context. Security therefore needs to be based on functions, dependencies and realistic threat scenarios rather than a generic technical baseline alone. Identity, configuration management, segmentation, cryptography, logging and physical access together form the defensive model, and their effectiveness depends on how they interact during normal and degraded operations.

Risk

A compromised identity, management chain or external supplier can provide access to several environments when trust relationships are not sufficiently constrained. Legacy systems, limited maintenance windows and specialist protocols increase the need for compensating controls. Weak segmentation may allow an incident in enterprise IT to affect operational or supporting processes. At the same time, aggressive testing or uncoordinated remediation can itself create an availability risk. Potential impact therefore extends beyond data loss to decision-making, logistics, communications and operational continuity. Formal compliance does not guarantee resistance to these scenarios if detection, escalation and recovery have not been shown to work under realistic conditions.

Points to check

• Smaller or less secure suppliers that may provide access to core defence systems.
• Dependence on non-European technology and standards.
• Continuity of expertise through training and retention of specialist personnel.
• The convergence of hybrid IT and OT environments typical of defence networks.

Approach

DeepBlue starts by establishing mission processes, critical assets, data flows and safety constraints with the responsible stakeholders. Threat scenarios are then translated into architecture reviews, configuration analysis, identity assessments and controlled penetration tests. In operational or OT environments, test methods are adapted to availability and safety requirements, with explicit stop conditions and coordination with system owners. Detection use cases are linked to concrete attack techniques and may be validated through proportionate purple-team activity. Incident roles, evidence preservation, alternative communications and recovery decisions are also exercised. The result is a prioritised improvement plan that brings technical findings, operational impact and implementation constraints into the same decision-making process.

Conclusion

Cyber warfare is a daily reality. The offensive capability of state actors is real and recurring, and supplier resilience is integral to the overall security posture. Europe must invest in its own expertise, tooling and operational structures. DeepBlue is ready to act as an independent, technically advanced partner within the defence domain.

Contact

Want to understand the impact in your own environment? Contact DeepBlue Security & Intelligence at info@deepbluesecurity.nl or +31 (0) 70 290 6 290.